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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

HERMES ASSOCIATES, a
Utah corporation,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

Case No. 900299-CA

vs.
:
PARK'S SPORTSMAN, a Utah
corporation,

Oral Argument Priority
No. 16

:

Defendant-Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION
This is an appeal as of right from a final judgment in a
civil case.
28, 1990.

The judgment appealed from was entered February
(R. 163-65.)

on March 28, 1990.

Appellant filed its Notice of Appeal

(R. 174-75.)

The Utah Supreme Court had

jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (Supp.
1990).

The Supreme Court transferred the case to the Court of

Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) . This Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Did defendant assume the role of surety where defend-

ant was required to perform obligations under a contract with
plaintiff only if a third party failed to perform as expected?

This is a question of contract interpretation subject to
review by this Court for correctness, with no deference to the
ruling of the trial court.

50 West Broadway Associates v. Re-

development Agency, 784 P.2d 1162, 1171 (Utah 1989).
2.

Was defendant relieved of its obligations to plain-

tiff under a contract, the obligation of which was contingent
upon and surety for the performance of a contract between
plaintiff and a third party, where plaintiff modified its
contract with the third party without the consent of defendant?
This is a question of contract interpretation subject to
review by this Court for correctness, with no deference to the
ruling of the trial court.
3.

Id.

Did the trial court err in attempting to avoid the

prejudicial effect of plaintiff's modifications of its contract
with a third party, performance of which was essentially
guaranteed by defendant, by reforming the contract between
plaintiff and defendant, where reformation was not pleaded nor
requested and there was no proof of mutual mistake?
The question of whether reformation was available under
the undisputed facts is a question of law subject to review by
this Court for correctness, with no deference to the ruling of
the trial court. See Bown v. Loveland, 678 P. 2d 292, 295 (Utah
1984) .
4.

Did the trial court err in awarding plaintiff pre-

judgment interest on obligations owed by defendant under a

2

contract, where defendant was unable to determine whether the
obligations were actually owed due to plaintiff's failure to
disclose necessary information?
The question of whether interest was available is a
question of law subject to review by this Court for correctness, with no deference to the ruling of the trial court. See
Joraensen v. John Clay and Co., 660 P.2d 229, 233 (Utah 1983).
5.

Did the trial court err in holding it had no discre-

tion to award defendant its reasonable attorney fees incurred
by reason of plaintiff's objections to defendant's request for
summary disposition, where there were no disputed issues of
fact and no purpose for a trial?
The question of whether the trial court had the authority
to award attorney fees is a question of law subject to review
by this Court for correctness, with no deference to the ruling
of the trial court. Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163,
169 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Park's is not aware of any constitutional provisions,
statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations whose interpretation is determinative of Issues 1 through 4 above. Rule 11 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is relevant to Issue 5:
Every pleading, motion, and other
paper of a party represented by an attorney
shall be signed by at least one attorney
of record in his individual name who is
duly licensed to practice in the state of
3

Utah. The attorney's address also shall
be stated. A party who is not represented
by an attorney shall sign his pleading,
motion, or other paper and state his
address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings
need not be verified or accompanied by
affidavit. The rule in equity that the
averments of an answer under oath must be
overcome by the testimony of two witnesses
or of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished.
The
signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has
read the pleading, motion, or other paper;
that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable
inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law, and that it
is not interposed for any improper purpose,
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation.
If a pleading, motion, or
other paper is not signed, it shall be
stricken unless it is signed promptly after
the omission is called to the attention of
the pleader or movant.
If a pleading,
motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion
or upon its own initiative, shall impose
upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate
sanction, which may include an order to pay
to the other party or parties the amount
of the reasonable expenses incurred because
of the filing of the pleading, motion, or
other paper, including a reasonable attorneyf s fee.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

enforce a written contract.

4

This is a civil action to

B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below,

Plaintiff ("Hermes") filed its Complaint on September 16,
1988.

(R. 2-5.)

Defendant ("Park's") filed its Answer and

Demand for Jury Trial on September 28, 1988.

(R. 8-10.)

Although no discovery had yet been conducted, Hermes filed a
Certification for Readiness for Trial on November 30, 1988.
(R. 11.)

Park's commenced discovery on December 1, 1988 (R.

12-14), and served its Objection to Request for Trial Setting
and Demand for Jury Trial on December 7, 1988.

(R. 15-16.)

The parties proceeded with some limited discovery, and on
September 1, 1989, Hermes filed a second request for trial
setting.
Trial

(R. 21.) Park's served its Objection to Request for

Setting

and Request

for Scheduling

Conference

on

September

12, 1989, asserting that discovery was not yet

complete,

that

Hermes's

prior

interrogatory

answers were

insufficient, and that Park's anticipated filing a dispositive
motion at the conclusion of discovery which would occur within
the next thirty to sixty days.

(R. 27-28.)

On the same date

as Park's Objection, however, the court filed a notice scheduling a pre-trial for November 17, 1989, and a trial for December
4, 1989.

(R. 24.)

Park's took additional depositions on October 3, 1989,
transcripts of which were completed on or about November 7,
1989.

(R. 31-34.)

On November 10, 1989, Park's served its

Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 3 6-37) and a supporting memo-

5

randum (R. 38-60) based in part on a deposition taken October
3, 1989.

Hermes responded with a Request that Defendant's

Motion For Summary [sic] Not Be Considered (R. 61-62), which
asserted that the motion was barred, by Rule 4-501 of the Utah
Code of Judicial Administration, because it was served within
thirty days of the scheduled trial date.
At the pre-trial held on November 17, 1989, Park's sought
relief from the time requirements of Rule 4-501 (R. 86-87) , but
the court declined to hear the motion.

The court vacated the

trial date of December 4, 1989, and rescheduled the matter for
trial on January 11, 1990.

(R. 63.)

Park's counsel made several additional

contacts with

Hermes's counsel to urge that the matter be submitted for
summary decision. Hermesfs counsel stated that he would review
the matter, and on December 18, 1989, finally stated that he
was not willing to submit the matter for summary decision. (R.
98-101.)
The case proceeded to trial on January 11, 1990.
102.)

(R.

At the beginning of trial, the court urged Hermes to

identify the areas of factual dispute.

(Tr. 1-7.)

Henries

asserted that there were factual issues (Tr. 6-7) , so the court
permitted testimony.

At the conclusion of Hermes's case,

Park's put on no evidence other than evidence of attorney fees
incurred by reason of Hermes's refusal to submit the matter for
summary decision.

(Tr. 76-79.)

6

At the conclusion of the evidence and after presentation
of arguments, the court entered judgment against Park's and sua
sponte reformed the Lease Cancellation Agreement by (a) establishing an amount of Gart gross sales which would relieve
Park's of its obligations regardless of the size of the leased
space or whether Gart had paid any percentage rent to Hermes,
and (b) requiring Hermes to annually notify Park's of the Gart
gross sales.

(R. 105-06.)

On Park's request for attorney

fees, the court found that there were no disputed issues of
fact and that no relevant facts were presented at trial which
were not inherent in the documents or which had not already
been stipulated to by the parties in their memoranda (Tr. 10102) , but held that it did not have discretion to award attorney
fees.

(Tr. 102.)
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 155-62) and

a Judgment (R. 163-65) were entered on February 28, 1990.
Park's filed its Notice of Appeal on March 28, 1990.

(R. 174-

75.)
C.

Statement of Facts.

Plaintiff Hermes Associates

("Hermes") is a Utah partnership which operates a shopping
center known as The Family Center at Midvalley, located at
Redwood Road and Interstate 215 in Salt Lake County.

(Tr. 16.)

On May 20, 1982, Park's Sportsman, Inc. ("Park's"), a Utah
corporation, became a tenant at The Family Center at Midvalley
and executed a lease agreement with Hermes.

7

(Tr. 17; Exhibit

6.)

The parties subsequently determined to terminate the

lease, and a Lease Cancellation Agreement, dated April 2, 1987,
was executed by the parties.

(Tr. 19; Exhibit 1.)

(A copy of

the Lease Cancellation Agreement is reproduced in the Appendix.)

The Lease Cancellation Agreement provides, in essence,

that the obligations under the Park's lease will be terminated
upon Hermes entering into a substitute lease with Gart Brothers
Sporting Goods, Inc., and that Park's will pay $1,000.00 per
month to Hermes until such time as Gart Brothers' sales reach
a certain level.
Hermes

subsequently

entered

into

Brothers, executed on April 7, 1987.

a

lease

with

Gart

(Tr. 33; Exhibit 5.)

Hermes never gave Park's a copy of the Gart lease. (Tr.
47.)

The terms of the Gart lease were substantially different

from the Park's lease. For example, the Park's lease provided
for a rental obligation of 3i% of the gross sales, with a
minimum

guaranteed

$56,430.00 per year.

amount

of

$4.18

per

square

foot, or

(Sales of $1,612,285.70 would be required

for the rentals computed as a percentage to exceed the minimum
base rent.)

(Tr. 57-58; Exhibit 6.)

The Gart lease, in

contrast, provided for percentage rent of 3%, with a base rent
of $4.00 per square foot, or $54,000.00 per year.

(Sales of

$1,800,000.00 would be required for the percentage rent to
exceed the base rent.)

(Tr. 57-58; Exhibit 5.)
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There is no evidence that Hermes ever informed Park's of
the terms of the Gart lease. (Tr. 47.)

The parties had an-

ticipated that Gart's sales would exceed the minimum required
to invoke the percentage rent figures.

(Exhibit 10.)

Because

Park's was obligated to Hermes only if Gart failed to perform
as expected, Park's sought information from Hermes concerning
Gart's gross sales. Hermes refused to provide the information,
other than to state that the sales had not reached the required
level.

(Exhibit 10.)

On October 26, 1987, Hermes and Gart amended their lease
agreement without notice to or consent from Park's.

(Tr. 45;

Exhibit 11.) Under the amended agreement, the space leased was
increased to 20,820 square feet.
13,500 square feet.)

(The prior leased space was

The amendment to the lease also changed

the volume of sales required before the percentage rents would
exceed the minimum base rent.
percentage

rent

under

the

Whereas the break point for
initial

Gart

agreement

was

$1,800,000.00, the break point under the amended Gart agreement
was $3,232,400.00.

(Exhibit 11.)

In response to requests

from Park's

for

information

concerning Gart Brothers' gross sales, Hermes took the position
that Park's was obligated to continue payments under the Lease
Cancellation Agreement until Gart had paid

$10,000.00 in

percentage rents, regardless of the terms of the Gart lease.
(Exhibit 14.)

Under the initial Gart lease, gross sales of

9

$2,13 3,000.00 would be required to obligate Gart Brothers to
pay percentage rents of $10,000.00 and thus terminate Park's
obligation under the Lease Cancellation Agreement.

(Tr. 61.)

Under the amendment to the lease, the required $10,000.00 in
percentage rents would not be reached until after gross sales
were $3,565,733.30.x
Park's viewed its obligation to Hermes as being terminated
and stopped making payments because Park's was unable to obtain
information concerning Gart's gross sales, and because the Gart
lease had been substantially modified without the knowledge or
consent of Park's.

Hermes thereafter brought this action to

recover the payments it claimed to be due under the Lease
Cancellation Agreement.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Lease Cancellation Agreement between Park's and Hermes
provided that Park's would make certain monthly payments to
Hermes, but that the obligation to make those payments would
terminate if and when the new tenant, Gart Brothers, reached
a sufficient volume of sales so that it was required to pay
$10,000.00 in percentage rents in excess of the base rent.

l

The
amended Gart lease provided a base rental of
$96,972.00 per year. That figure divided by 3% (.03) yields
the break point for percentage rent of $3,232,400.00. If rents
are to exceed the base by $10,000.00, the total rent would be
$106,972.00. That figure divided by .03 yields $3,565,733.30,
which is the total gross sales required to achieve $10,000.00
in percentage rent payments under the amended Gart lease.
10

This condition placed Park's in the position of surety for Gart
Brothers.

When Hermes thereafter modified the Gart lease

without the consent or knowledge of Park's and further refused
to give Park's any information concerning the terms of the
lease or the gross sales achieved under the lease, Park's
obligation to Hermes was terminated by operation of law.
The trial court implicitly acknowledged that the modification of the Gart lease was prejudicial to Park's by reforming
the contract to eliminate part of the effect of the Gart lease
modification.

Reformation was a remedy which was neither

sought by the parties nor justified by the evidence.

The

appropriate remedy under the circumstances was termination of
any ongoing obligations of Park's under the Lease Cancellation
Agreement.
The trial court also erred in awarding interest on the
past due payments.

Park's failure to make the payments was

justified by Hermes' refusal to provide information concerning
the Gart Brothers gross sales, and by Hermes' claim that Park's
obligation would continue until Gart Brothers paid $10,000.00
in percentage rents, even though under the amendment, the level
of Gart sales required to reach $10,000.00 in percentage rents
had almost doubled.

Under these circumstances, it would be

inequitable to award Hermes interest as a reward for its own
wrongful conduct.

11

Finally, the trial court erred in holding that it did not
have discretion to award Park's its reasonable attorney fees
incurred in defending this action. Hermes needlessly increased
the cost of the litigation by objecting to Park's attempts to
present the matter for summary disposition, and persisting in
its demand for a trial when there were no issues of fact to be
tried.

It is implicit from the terms of both Rule 11 of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56
(Supp. 1990) that a party can be sanctioned where an otherwise
valid lawsuit is conducted in a oppressive manner or in a
manner which evidences bad faith. The trial court has inherent
power to punish and discourage such behavior.

The trial court

had discretion to award Park's its attorney fees, and the case
should be remanded to allow the trial court to make such an
award.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
PARK"S OBLIGATION TO HERMES, WHICH WAS CONTINGENT
UPON GART BROTHERS PERFORMANCE, WAS TERMINATED WHEN
HERMES MODIFIED ITS LEASE WITH GART BROTHERS.
The Lease Cancellation Agreement between Hermes and Park's
provides that Park's obligations thereunder will terminate when
Gart Brothers pays $10,000 in percentage rents to Hermes in one
year.

The parties anticipated at the time of execution that

the contingency would occur within a year.
12

Park's was not

aware of the terms of the Gart lease at the time the Lease
Cancellation Agreement was executed, but assumed that the Gart
lease would be similar to the Park's lease•

In fact, there

were substantial differences between the two leases. The level
of sales required to achieve $10,000 in percentage rent was
significantly higher under the Gart lease than under the Park's
lease.
Park's commenced making payments under the Lease Cancellation Agreement, and subsequently

sought verification from

Hermes concerning Gart Brothers gross sales.
to provide the information.

Hermes refused

Park's later discovered that

Hermes had amended its lease agreement with Gart.

Under the

amended Gart lease, the level of sales required to achieve
$10,000 in percentage rents was nearly doubled.
One of the implied terms of any contract, including the
Lease Cancellation Agreement, is a mutual covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. This covenant is breached when a party
acts in a way to make the other party's performance more
difficult.

When a party has breached the covenant by making

the performance of the other more difficult, the other party
is excused from further performance.

Zion's Properties, Inc.

v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319, 1321 (Utah 1975).

See also 1-5 Truck

Sales & Service Co. v. Underwood, 32 Wash. App. 4, 645 P.2d
716, 720 n.l (1982); Potrero Homes v. Western Orbis Co., 28
Cal. App. 3d 450, 104 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1972).
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Hermes breached

its covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and thereby
discharged Park's from further obligations under the Lease
Cancellation Agreement, when Hermes changed the nature of the
Gart least without the consent of Park's.
This result is corroborated by analogy to the law of
suretyship.

The Lease Cancellation Agreement puts Park's in

the position of guaranteeing that Hermes will receive a minimum
sum

from

its

agreement

with

Gart

Brothers.

If

Gart's

percentage rent does not reach $10,000 in a given 12 month
period, Hermes is entitled to receive $12,000 from Park's
during that period.

Park's is thus placed in a suretyship

role, with Hermes and Gart occupying the roles of creditor and
principal obligor. The fact that this relationship is not the
result of an express surety agreement is not relevant.

"There

is no required form for a surety contract and it is not necessary that the [party acting as surety] be labeled 'surety' on
the face of the contract."

Andrus v. Zion's First National

Bank of Qgden, 99 Idaho 724, 726, 588 P.2d 452, 454 (1978).
See also Fluke Capital & Management Services Co. v. Richmond,
106 Wash. 2d 614, 724 P.2d 356, 361 (1986); 74 Am. Jur. 2d
Suretyship § 7 (1974).
In determining whether a suretyship exists, the primary
focus is whether the alleged surety is responsible to the
creditor for the performance of the principal obligor.

When

"the ultimate effect of the transaction [is] to secure the

14

debts of another," a suretyship exists.
454.

Andrus, 588 P.2d at

See also State v. McKinnon, 667 P.2d 1239, 1242 (Alaska

1983) ; 74 Am. Jur. 2d Suretyship § 1 (1974) ; 72 C.J.S. Principal and Surety § 33 (1987).

If the nature of the transaction

creates a suretyship, the incidents surrounding the suretyship
may vary within certain latitude without changing the character
of the relationship.

In the instant case, Park's is responsi-

ble to Hermes for up to $60,000 in the event Gart fails to pay
Hermes $10,000 annually in percentage rent for five years.
Like other surety arrangements, Park's is excused from performance if Gart pays the required level of rent.

The Lease

Cancellation Agreement clearly operates to make Park's a surety
for Gart's performance.
Because Park's obligations were contingent on and surety
for Gart's performance under the Gart lease, any change in the
Gart lease affected Park's. The law provides that such changes
terminate the obligation of the surety.
Any agreement or dealing between the
principal parties to an obligation or debt
which essentially varies the term of the
contract without the consent of the surety
will release him from liability, even
though the alteration may not injure him,
or maybe beneficial to him.
When the
change is made without his consent, the
surety is not bound by the contract in its
altered form; it ceases to be his contract,
and with that his obligation ceases.
74 Am. Jur. 2d Suretyship § 41 (1974) (emphasis added). Accord
Valley Bank & Trust v. Rite Way Concrete Forming, Inc., 742

15

P.2d 105, 108-09 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), cert, denied, 765 P.2d
1277 (Utah 1988) ; Gebrueder Heidemann, K.G. v. A.M.R. Corp.,
113 Idaho 510, 688 P.2d 1180, 1185 (Idaho 1984); Hester v.
Ross, Banks, May, Cron & Cavin, 492 S.W.2d 378, 379 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1973).
The facts of the instant case confirm the need for such
a rule preventing Hermes from modifying the Gart lease without
Park's consent. The amendment to the Gart lease nearly doubled
the level of gross sales required to obligate Gart to pay
$10,000 in percentage rent to Hermes.2

When Park's requested

verification from Hermes of the amount of gross sales and an
explanation of the effect of the lease modification, Gart's
response was, in essence, a statement that Park's would remain
obligated to Hermes until Gart paid $10,000 in percentage
rents, regardless of any change of the Gart lease which might

2

The trial court acknowledged the prejudicial effect of
the amendment to the Gart lease by attempting to reform the
Lease Cancellation Agreement to provide that Park's obligations
thereunder would terminate when Gart reached gross sales of
$2,133,000.00, regardless of whether Gart paid any percentage
rents to Hermes. Even as thus reformed, the amendment to the
Gart lease still effected a material change in Park's risk.
The amendment nearly doubled the base rent owed by Gart to
Hermes and thereby increased the risk of Gart being unable to
perform even its minimum obligations under the amended lease.
In addition, reformation was not proper. No party sought
reformation in its pleadings, although reformation must be
specifically pleaded. Briggs v. Liddell, 699 P.2d 770, 772
(Utah 1985). Also lacking was any proof of the mutual mistake
required to support a decree of reformation. Id. The only
permissible remedy under the pleadings and the evidence was
cancellation of Park's obligations, not reformation.
16

make achieve of that level of percentage rents less likely.
(See Exhibit 14, a copy of which appears in the Appendix.) The
response of the law to such conduct is simple, as described
above: where Hermes made an agreement with Gart which affected
the character of Park's obligations under the Lease Cancellation Agreement, Park's was relieved of further obligations
under the Lease Cancellation Agreement.

The trial court's

judgment to the contrary was in error and should be reversed.
POINT II
HERMES WAS NOT ENTITLED TO PRE-JUDGMENT
INTEREST WHERE HERMES HAD FAILED AND REFUSED TO
PROVIDE PARK'S WITH VERIFICATION OF THE AMOUNT DUE.
The trial court held that Hermes had an implicit obligation as part of the Lease Cancellation Agreement to provide
Park's with documentation concerning Gart Brother's gross
sales. Without such information, it was impossible for Park's
to determine whether it in fact owed any amounts to Hermes.
Although interest is usually awarded where a fixed sum is
due under a contract and not paid, the rule is different where
the delay in payment is caused by the wrongful conduct of the
person entitled to payment.

Amoss v. Bennion, 23 Utah 2d 40,

456 P.2d 172, 175 (1969); Blomcruist v. Bingham, 652 P.2d 900,
902 (Utah 1982).

Park's failure to make timely and monthly

payments to Hermes was excusable by reason of Hermes' failure
to provide documentation that the amount was actually due.

17

Park's obligation to pay interest under said circumstances was
excused.

The judgment of the trial court should be reversed

with instructions to vacate the judgment for pre-judgment
interest.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT HAD DISCRETION TO AWARD
ATTORNEY FEES HAS A SANCTION FOR HERMES1 CONDUCT
IN INCREASING THE COST OF THE LITIGATION.
There were no material disputed

facts in this case.

Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment at the earliest
possible opportunity following completion of discovery, but
Hermes resisted the motion because it was not filed at least
30 days prior to trial.

Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-501(3) (g).

After the trial date was subsequently vacated, however, Hermes
continued to resist the suggestions of the trial court and
Park's counsel that the case be submitted for summary decision.
Both Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Utah
Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1987) proscribe conduct by a party which
serves only to increase the cost of the litigation and is not
made in good faith. The trial court in this case acknowledged
that the case should have been summarily decided and that the
trial was a waste of time.

The court held, however, that it

did not have discretion to award attorney's fees under those
circumstances. Where a trial court applies an erroneous legal
standard in exercising its discretion, the matter should be

18

reviewed for correctness and remanded to the trial court for
decision in light of the correct legal standard.

Ferris v.

Jennings, 595 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1979).
The trial court has inherit power to regulate the conduct
of counsel and parties appearing before it.

Park's presented

testimony that the refusal of Hermes to submit the matter for
summary decision increased the legal fees to Park's by at least
$5,459.85.

(Tr. 78.)

Hermes' counsel signed and filed a

request for a trial when there were no issues to be tried.
Hermes submitted documents resisting Park's attempts to have
the matter decided without a trial.

The trial court had

discretion to discourage such conduct by awarding Park's its
attorney's fees.
court with

This case should be remanded to the trial

instructions to determine whether an award of

attorney's fees is appropriate under the circumstances.
CONCLUSION
Park's obligations under the Lease Cancellation Agreement
were contingent upon, and surety for, the performance of Gart
Brothers

under

its

subsequent

lease

with

Hermes.

The

subsequent amendment and modification of the Gart lease by
Hermes materially affected Park's rights and was made without
Park's consent. The modification operated to discharge Park's
future obligations under the Lease Cancellation Agreement and
the trial court should have so held.

19

The trial erred in awarding Hermes interest for Park's
delay in payment, where the delay was a result of Hermes
unjustified refusal to provide documentation of the amount of
Gart Brother's gross sales.
Finally, the trial court had discretion to award plaintiff's its attorney's fees, and committed error as a matter of
law in failing to exercise that discretion.
The judgment in favor of Hermes should be vacated and the
case remanded for entry of judgment in favor of Park's, no
cause of action.

Alternatively, the portion of the judgment

awarding Hermes pre-judgment interest should be vacated.
In any event, this Court should hold that the trial court
had discretion to award a reasonable attorney fee under the
circumstances of this case, and the case should be remanded
with a direction to award such a fee.
DATED this 18th day of September, 1990.

JACKSON HOWARD,
<//
KEVIN J. SUTTERFIELD and
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Appellant
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this
18th day of September, 1990.
Nick J. Colessides, Esq.
466 South 400 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3303
Attorney for Appellee
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APPENDIX "A"
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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NICK J. COLESSIDES (# 696)
Attorney for Plaintiff
466 South 400 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3303
Tele: (801) 521-4441

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

HERMES ASSOCIATES, a Utah
Partnership,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.
PARK'S SPORTSMAN, a Utah
Corporation,

Case No. C-88-6074
Judge:

Wilkinson

Defendant.

This matter came on regularly for trial, pursuant
to notice, on the 11th day of January, 1990, before the
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge, presiding without a jury;
Plaintiff Hermes Associates was present by and through J. Rees
Jensen, one of its General Partners, and plaintiff was being
represented by Nick J. Colessides, attorney at law; defendant
Park's Sportsman, a Utah corporation, was present by Russell
W. Park, its president, and was being represented by Jackson
Howard, attorney at law;

the Court having

adduced and

received evidence on behalf of all parties, and the Court
having heard argument on behalf of all parties, and the matter

00^55

having been submitted to the Court, now upon motion of Nick J.
Colessides, attorney for plaintiff, and good cause otherwise
appearing therefor, the Court makes the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On or about May 20, 1982, Hermes as Landlord,
and Park's as Tenant, entered into a lease agreement (the
"Park's Lease") affecting certain retail commercial space
located at Hcar-mes1 shopping center, known as the Midvalley
Family Center, at 5666 South Redwood Road, Salt Lake County,
Utah.
2.

Defendant Park's entered into possession of

the leased premises and operated its retail sporting goods
store until sometime in April 2nd, 1987.
3. On April 2nd, 1987, Hermes and Park's entered
into a LEASE CANCELLATION AGREEMENT, canceling the Park's
Lease.
4.

The

LEASE

CANCELLATION

AGREEMENT

obligated

Park's to commence on May 1, 1987, and continue for sixty (60)
months, the payment of One Thousand ($1,000.00) Dollars for
each

and

every

month,

subject

to

the

percentage

lease

agreement and gross sales of $ 1,800,000.00 of Gart Bros.
5-

The

LEASE

CANCELLATION

AGREEMENT

became

effective as of the effective date upon which Hermes would
enter (and in fact entered) into a lease agreement with Gart
Bros.
2

6.

As far as the sales volume is concerned the

LEASE TERMINATION AGREEMENT applies to all of the space,
20,820 square feet, leased to Gart Bros.
7.
operative

The LEASE CANCELLATION AGREEMENT

document

wherein

the

respective

is the

rights

and

obligations of the plaintiff and defendant are clearly set
forth.
8.

The LEASE CANCELLATION AGREEMENT is a new

agreement, valid and subsisting in and of itself, and not
dependent upon any other document, except as it relates to
paragraph 4 above.
10.

The LEASE CANCELLATION AGREEMENT contained,

inter alia, the following terms:
1. Lease Agreement Cancellation. The Commercial
and Industrial Lease Agreement of May 20, 1982, and all
subsequent addendums or modifications are incorporated herein
by reference. The said Lease Agreement and all addendums and
modifications are hereby declared canceled effective as of the
date on which a Lease Agreement between Hermes and Gart
Brothers Sporting Goods, Inc., becomes effective.
2.
Consideration.
In consideration of the
cancellation of said Agreement, Park's does by this instant
agree to pay Hermes the sum of One Thousand Dollars
($1,000.00) per month for a term of sixty (60) months
commencing on the 1st day of May, 1987, and continuing
thereafter until sixty (60) installments have been paid or
unless the said obligation is terminated or canceled by reason
of the operation of Provision 3 following.
3. Termination and Rebate. Hermes acknowledges
that effective on the date that Hermes enters into a Lease
Agreement with Gart Brothers Sporting Goods, Inc., for the
lease rights of Park's to the premises located at
approximately 5666 South Redwood Road, Salt Lake City, Utah,
that this
Lease Cancellation
Agreement
will
become
3

contemporaneously effective.
When and if Gart Brothers
Sporting Goods, Inc., make a percentage rent payment to Hermes
in any twelve (12) month period of a sum in excess of Ten
Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) for the subject demised
premises, Hermes will cancel the payment requirements of
Provision 2 above and thereafter Park's will have no
obligation to make further installment payments, provided that
all installment payments previously due and payable to Hermes
have been paid. It is further provided that at such time as
Hermes receives the first said percentage rental payment in
excess of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) from Gart Brothers
Sporting Goods, Inc., Hermes will refund to Park's up to
Twelve Thousand Dollars ($12,000.00) in accordance to the
amount due and paid by Park's during the twelve (12) months
for which said percentage rent was paid to Hermes by Gart
Brothers Sporting Goods, Inc.
11.

The effective date of a lease between Hermes

and Gart Bros, (the "Gart Lease") was the 7th day of April,
1987.
12.

The terms of the Parks Sportsman's Lease,

dated May 20, 1982, were not taken over by Gart Bros.
13.

The obligation of Park's to pay the $

1,000.00 per month was to continue until Gart Bros made to
Hermes a percentage rent payment in any twelve (12) month
period of a sum in excess of Ten Thousand ($ 10,000.00)
Dollars, under the Gart Lease.
14.

Park's

commenced

the

monthly

payments

pursuant to the LEASE CANCELLATION AGREEMENT and made eleven
(11) payments thereunder amounting to the sum of $ 11,000.00.
15. Park's did not pay the monthly payment due on
April 1, 1988, and made no other payments thereafter.
16.

As of the date of the trial Park's has not
4

made twenty two (22) required monthly payments, amounting to
the sum of Twenty Two Thousand ($ 22,000.00) Dollars.
17.

It was not intended by Hermes that Park's be

excused from performance (i.e., the payment of $ 1,000.00 per
month) on April 2, or on October 1, 1987, or January 1, 1988,
or April 1, 1988, except for the provisions of paragraphs 2
and 3 of the LEASE CANCELLATION AGREEMENT.
18. The Court finds that any subsequent (to April
2, 1987) agreement(s) between Hermes and Gart Bros is not and
it is not deemed to be a novation of the LEASE CANCELLATION
AGREEMENT.
19. The Court finds that Park's was not a surety
nor a guarantor of the Gart Bros Lease, or any of the
obligations thereunder.
20.

The Court finds that Gart Bros would not

assume the obligations of Park's under the Park's Lease, nor
under the LEASE CANCELLATION AGREEMENT.
22. During the first year, ending on December 31,
1987, or the second year ending on December 31, 1988, or the
third year ending on December 31, 1989, of the Gart Bros
Lease, Gart Bros did not achieve gross sales in sufficient
amounts

so

as to obligate

Gart

Bros

to pay

to Hermes

percentage rents in excess of $ 10,000.00.
23.

Gart Bros did not make a percentage rent

payment to Hermes Associates, in any twelve month period, of
5

a sum in excess of Ten Thousand ($ 10,000.00) Dollars for the
total space 20,820 square feet) leased to Gart Bros.
24.

Plaintiff is entitled to receive and does

receive from Gart Bros the information regarding Gart bros
sales

in

the

leased

premises.

It

is

Plaintiff's

responsibility that Plaintiff should provide the information
so received to the Defendant, as soon as possible after
receiving it from Gart Bros.
25.

Plaintiff

is

entitled

to

prejudgment

interest, at the rate of 10% per annum, amounting to the total
sum of $ 1,990.93 as of the date of the trial, together with
an accrued daily interest at the prejudgment rate of $ 6.03
for each day from January 11th, 1990, until the date of the
entry of the judgment, and thereafter at the rate of 12% per
annum.
26.

Neither party is entitled to an award of

attorneyf s fees.
27.

Plaintiff

is entitled

to

its costs in

connection with this action.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court now
enters its
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiff is entitled to judgment in the

principal sum of $ 22,000.00; plus
2.

Pre-judgment interest at the rate of 10% per
6

annum from the date that each monthly installment was due to
the date of the entry of the judgment, which sum is $1,990.93
as of January 11th, 1990, plus such additional sum equal to
the rate of $ 6.03 per day until the date of the entry of the
judgment, and thereafter interest at the rate of 12% per
annum.
3. Plaintiff is entitled to its costs of suit the
same to be submitted by affidavit to the court by plaintiff's
counsel.
4.

Neither party is entitled to an award of

attorneyf s fees.
5.

Defendant is entitled to be notified of the

volume of the annual gross sales generated by Gart Bros in the
entire 20,820 square foot leased premises; plaintiff shall
notify defendant as soon as plaintiff obtains the information
relating to the volume of sales from Gart Bros.
6.

Defendant should not be required to make

payments under the LEASE CANCELLATION AGREEMENT at such time
as Plaintiff receives from Gart Bros a percentage rental
payment in excess of Ten thousand ($ 10,000.00) Dollars, which
sum is calculated against a gross sales base of One Million
Eight Hundred Thousand ($ 1,800,000.00) Dollars, regardless of
what

minimum

rent

may

apply

to

the

Gart

Lease

percentage rentals become applicable thereunder.

7

before

DATED this

>y

day of February, 1990.

/
/

HOMER F. WILKINSON
District Court Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM AND SUBSTANCE:

JA
KEVIN J. SUTTERFIELD
Attorneys for Defendant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law to Mr. Jackson Howard, attorney for
defendant, 120 East 300 North Street, P. 0. Box 778, Provo,
Utah 84603, postage prepaid, this ^y>?A- day of February,
1990.

HAPARK.11
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APPENDIX "B"
Judgment

FES 2 3 1S30
u, >

*„ark

NICK J. COLESSIDES (# 696)
Attorney for Plaintiff
466 South 400 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3303
Tele: (801) 521-4441

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

HERMES ASSOCIATES, a Utah
Partnership,

JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
CU>,

vs.
PARK'S SPORTSMAN, a Utah
Corporation,

Case No. C-88-6074
Judge:

Wilkinson

Defendant,

This matter came on regularly for trial, pursuant
to notice, on the 11th day of January, 1990, before the
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge, presiding without a jury;
Plaintiff Hermes Associates was present by and through J. Rees
Jensen, one of its General Partners, and plaintiff was being
represented by Nick J. Colessides, attorney at law; defendant
Park's Sportsman, a Utah corporation, was present by Russell
W. Park, its president, and was being represented by Jackson
Howard, attorney

at law;

the Court having entered its

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED AND ADJUDGED
that Plaintiff HERMES ASSOCIATES be awarded judgment against
defendant PARKfS SPORTSMAN, a Utah Corporation, in the amount
of:
$ 22,000.00 Principal balance
$ 2,189.92 Accrued interest to date of judgment
$

83.25 Accrued costs to date of judgment

$ 24,273.17

TOTAL JUDGMENT

with interest on the total judgment at 12.0% per annum as
provided by law from the date of this judgment until paid,
plus after accruing costs; and
IT IS HEREBY, FURTHER, ORDERED that Defendant is
entitled to be notified of the volume of the annual gross
sales generated by Gart Bros in the entire 20,820 square foot
leased premises; plaintiff shall notify defendant as soon as
plaintiff obtains the information relating to the volume of
sales from Gart Bros.
IT IS HEREBY, FURTHER, ORDERED that Defendant
should not be required to make payments under the LEASE
CANCELLATION AGREEMENT at such time as Plaintiff receives from
Gart Bros a percentage rental payment in excess of Ten
thousand

($ 10,000.00) Dollars, which sum

is

calculated

against a gross sales base of One Million Eight Hundred
Thousand ($ 1,800,000.00) Dollars, regardless of what minimum
rent may apply to the Gart Bros Lease before percentage

rentals become applicable thereunder.
DATED this

X *

day of February, 1990,

HOMER F. WILKINSON
District Court Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM AND SUBSTANCE:

JACKStJN (ftdWARD
KEVIN J. SUTTERFIELD

MAILING CERTIFICATE
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Judgment to Mr.
Jackson Howard, attorney for defendants 120 East 300 North
Street, "P.O. Box 778, Provo, Utah 84^fc)3^ postage prepaid,
this y^l4f
day of February, 1990.

HAPARK.13

3

APPENDIX "C"
Lease Cancellation Agreement
(Exhibit 1)

LEASE CANCELLATION AGREEMENT

THIS AGREEMENT made and entered Into this 2nd day of April, 1987, by
and between Hermes Associates, a Utah partnership, hereinafter called "Hermes"
and Park's Sportsman, a Utah corporation, hereinafter called "Park's * and
WHEREAS, Hermes and Park's have entered into a Commercial and Industrial
Lease under an Agreement dated May 20, 1982, and
WHEREAS, it is the intent and purpose of the parties to this Agreement
to cancel said Lease Agreement conditioned upon certain terms and conditions
herein stated,
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants of each of
the parties hereto
IT IS AGREED:
1. Lease Agreement Cancellation. The Commercial and Industrial
Lease Agreement of May 20, 1982, and all subsequent addendums or modifications
are incorporated herein by reference. The said Lease Agreement and all addendums
and modifications are hereby declared cancelled effective as of the date on which
a Lease Agreement between Hermes and Cart Brothers Sporting Goods, Inc. becomes
effective.
2. Consideration. In consideration of the cancellation of said
Agreement, Park's does by this instant agree to pay Hermes the sum of One Thousand
Dollars (51,000.00) per month for a term of sixty (60) months commencing on the
1st day of May, 1987, and continuing thereafter until sixty (60) installments
have been paid or unless the said obligation is terminated or cancelled by
reason of the operation of Provision 3 following.
3. Termination and Rebate. Hermes acknowledges that effective on
the date that Hermes enters into a Lease Agreement with Gart Brothers Sporting
Goods, Inc. for the lease rights of Park's to the premises located at approximately 5666 South Redwood Road, Salt Lake City, Utah that this Lease Cancellation
Agreement will become contemporaneously effective. When and if Gart Brothers
Sporting Goods, Inc. make a percentage rent payment to Hermes in any twelve (12)
month period of a sum in excess of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) for the
subject demised premises, Hermes will cancel the payment requirements of
Provision 2 above and thereafter Park's will have no obligation to make further
installment payments, provided that all installment payments previously due and
payable to Hermes have been paid. It is further provided that at such time as
Hermes receives the first said percentage rental payment in excess of Ten
Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) from Gart Brothers Sporting Goods, Inc., Hermes
will refund to Park's up to Twelve Thousand Dollars ($12,000.00) in accordance
to the amount due and paid by Park's during the twelve (12) months for which
said percentage rent was paid to Hermes by Gart Brothers Sporting Goods, Inc.
*•• Satisfaction of Promissory Note. Upon receipt by Hermes of the
sum of One Hundred Thirty Thousand Dollars ($130,000.00) from Gart Brothers
Sporting Goods, Inc. (due and payable on or before May 1, 1987) aa reimbursement for che total sum of One Hundred Forty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Dollars
($K8.500.00) paid by Hermes to Psrk's for tenant leasehold improvements in the
subject demised premises, Hermes shall return to Park's that certain promissory
note dated August 1, 1986 covering said sum marked "Paid in Full."

PARX'S SPORTSMAN, a Utah corporation

HERMES ASSOCIATES, a Utah partnership

BY:

BY:

JJk+L'Jt

L^

/ J J. Rees Jenay*
1 / Senior General Partner
ATTEST: Secretary

'

APPENDIX "D"
May 23, 1988, Letter from Hermes to Park's
(Exhibit 14)

I

^EXHIBIT

HERMES ASSOCIATES
May 23, 1988
Certified Mail - Return Receipt Requested
Russell and Randy Park
Park's Sportsman
644 North State
Orem, Utah 84057
Re:

Letter received from Jackson Howard dated May 17, 1988

Dear Russ and Randy,
I am in receipt of a letter addressed to Rees Jensen dated May 17, 1988
from Jackson Howard. As you know I am head of operations and responsible
for the collection of past due monies. In such capacity I am responding
to clarify what seems to be a misunderstanding.
First and most important to understand, with respect to your $1,000 obligation
that the agreement and lease we had with Park Sporting Goods has nothing
whatever to do with the agreement and lease that we have with Gart Sporting
Goods. I have included herewith a copy of the lease cancellation agreement
wherein the details are specified. After the whereas1 and now therefore1s,
there are four points to the agreement. First the lease is cancelled,
second, in consideration of the cancellation, you have an obligation to make
$1,000 per month payment for 60 months or five years. Third, in the event
that Gart Brothers begins paying percentage rents in excess of $10,000 your
further obligation on the $1,000 per month portion in item 2 would terminate
and you would also get a refund. Tourth, there was the issue of the satisfaction of the promissory note.
Item #1 as stated above has been completed in as much as your lease has been
terminated. Item #4 as above explained has also been completed and there
only remains items 2 and 3. You have an obligation to pay us $1,000 a month
every month for 60 months. That is not tied to the terms of your lease nor
Is it tied to the terms of the Gart Brothers lease. That is simply an obligation that you carry as a consideration for the lease cancellation.
In our agreement we further went on to say that in the event that Gart Brothers
began paying percentage rent which would exceed $10,000 for any 12 month period
that your obligation would cease. Note that the agreement says when and if
Gart Brothers Sporting Goods begins to make percentage rent payments in a 12
month period or a sum in excess of $10,000. Thus far Gart Brothers has not
paid any percentage rent.

OWNER/DEVELOPER OF
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Russell and Randy Park
May 23, 1988
Page 2

Your attorney raises three questions in his letter which have nothing to do
with anything. In Item #1 he states that you assumed that the percent rent
clauses in the two leases would be identical• That is not part of our agreement. It was not spoken, and it is not written. The only reference to
percentage rents that has anything to do with you is the statement that when
and if Gart Brothers pays percentage rent, your obligation will cease subject
to the exact language. Item #2 in your attorneys letter makes no sense to
me and therefore I canft respond to it. Item #3 in your attorney^ letter has
to do with the increase of space. Nothing in our agreement between Hermes
Associates and Parks precludes us from making any further deals with Gart
Brothers.
We have in fact made a deal for additional space but that has
nothing to do with the lease cancellation agreement that I have included herewith.
The upshot of this letter is that there is not relationship between Parks
lease which has been cancelled and the Gart Brothers lease which is now in
effect as it was originally done or as it may be modified or modified in the
future. The only tie between Garts and Parks is the lease cancellation
agreement and the only item of concern to Parks is whether or not Gart Brothers
is or has made any percentage rents. The fact of the matter is that Garts have
not paid percentage rents, are not in percentage rents by the terms of their
lease as has been reported to us by and through terms which are specified in
their lease.
I fail to understand all of the confusion on your side and the apparent
continued supposition that there is some great dark secret that is being
kept from you. The lease cancellation agreement is very clear and I am
hereby certifying to you that Garts has paid us not penny one in percent
rent. At such [time asrwe receive percentage rents from them, we will honor
the term of clause 3 of our lease cancellation agreement but until that time
we expect to receive from Parks $1,000 per month for the period of 60 months
which began on the first day of May, 1987.
I am sure that Garts would be willing to tell you as to whether or not they *
have paid percentage rents at THE .FAMILY £ENTER .at MIDVALLEY if they are askedf
and we certainly are not keeping anything from you. If you have any further
questions on the matter please feel free to get in touch with me. I would be
happy to discuss it with you, I would be happy to meet with you, but I do
expect the $1,000 per month as per our agreement• At the present time you owe
us $1,000 for April,-$1,000 for Hay, and we will have another payment of $1,000
coming due on June 1st. I fully expect these amounts to be brought current and
if we do not have checks "in Txand for April and May by June 1st, 1988, we will
take the appropriate legal action.
Very truly yours,

Enc.
DLH/ec

Douglas L. Holmberg
Vice President and
Director of Operations

